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The AI labs' founders · Anthropic, OpenAI, DeepMind, Elon Musk · Spoken appearances 2012–2026

Eight questions about the AGI future, and what the AI labs' founders think

Will people have meaningful jobs? Who gets what? Are humans still in control, still human, still here? This page sets out what fourteen people at the frontier labs have said, or implied, about each question in about 1,200 transcribed interviews, talks and hearings. From Anthropic: Dario Amodei, Daniela Amodei, Jack Clark, Jared Kaplan, Chris Olah, Tom Brown and Ben Mann. From OpenAI: Sam Altman, Greg Brockman and the chief scientist Jakub Pachocki, who is not a co-founder. From DeepMind: Demis Hassabis and Mustafa Suleyman, who now runs Microsoft AI. And Elon Musk, who co-founded OpenAI, founded xAI and is listed here under SpaceX. We say which answers are explicit and which we inferred, and where someone has said nothing.

At a glance

QuestionAnthropicOpenAIDeepMindSpaceX
DarioDanielaJackJaredChrisTomBenSamGregJakubDemisMustafaElon
1. Meaningful jobs?Yes for now, then mostly noYes, changedYes, after upheavalWorried, no answerMass displacement possibleImplicitly yesNot as we know themYes; rejects post-workWork optional, still strivingMany automated; replacement an open questionYes for 5–10 years; then unknownMostly no paid work, and that's fineWork optional, "like a hobby"
2. Human marginal contributionSupervising, then setting goals. TemporaryCare, relationshipsTaste, direction, careJudging AI's workUnder­standing, safety judgementContext, directionPlanning, taste (1–3 years)People prefer people; judgementGoals, accountabilityGoal-setting, directionCare, taste, human endeavourNothing durable; society's choiceWill and meaning; nothing AI can't do better
3. How resources are allocatedMarkets plus taxes and basic incomeRedistribute, mechanism unspecifiedTax AI firms and computeMarkets and law; "thorny"No mechanism yetGrowth and investmentPost-capitalist, unspecifiedFloor: UBI, then shared compute or equityCompute as a rightNeeds policymakers; no mechanismPublic stakes; new system neededTax capital; UBI"Universal high income"; then money irrelevant
4. What is scarcePhysical world, laws, timeCompute now; human presencePower, labs, oversight, attentionAdoption; AI itself cheapTrust, understandingPower, chips, permitsInstitutions, experimentsEnergy; attention, status goodsCompute; human attentionEnergy, robotics; intellectual work cheapChips, experiments; then purposeChips, land, powerOnly artificial scarcity; "wattage and tonnage"
5. Ratio of AIs to humans10M–100M "geniuses"One assistant eachUp to 10,000:1 in firmsMillions of copies—Million-fold2,000 per developer10,000 per person; "a trillion AIs"100,000 per personAutomated firms run by a fewDozens eachA team each; swarms a riskRobots 2–3:1; digital intelligence up to a trillion-fold
6. Humans in control?Should be, by choice. Not assuredHumans in the driver's seatYes now; window closingBalance of power shiftsOnly if we understand AIExpects a handoff to AI"God in a box"Must be, no handoff (2026); once doubtedHumans set goals; "hard stop"Humans set direction; be ready to slow downShould be; unsolvedAI "subordinate"; may failRegulation, then "AI is going to be in charge"
7. Still human?Human, longer-lived; pluralist on brain linksStill humanHuman, tool-augmented—Smarter through understanding—Uploads as fiction onlyMerge once; now still humanDeflects; death "a choice"—Human; optional brain linksHumanist; uploading dangerousNeuralink merge, then dropped
8. Chance of extinction10–25% catastrophe (2023), now conditionalNo numberNot above 10%; no numberImplies ~10% is too highDeep worry, no numberPossible, no number0–10%"2%" (2025); now no level acceptableBad by default; no numberNo number; most unstable since the atomic bombNon-zero, unquantified<10%, then near zero (2023); now none~80% good, 10–20% bad (2023–26); 90/10 (Sept 2026)

Mustafa Suleyman co-founded DeepMind with Hassabis and Shane Legg, then co-founded Inflection AI and has run Microsoft AI since 2024. Most of his material comes from those later roles. Sam McCandlish (Anthropic) is left out of the table. His only source is the December 2024 co-founder roundtable, and no line in it can be confidently attributed to him. One closing turn about studying the risks of very advanced systems with interpretability may be his, or Jared Kaplan's. Jakub Pachocki is not a co-founder. He became OpenAI's chief scientist in 2024 and is included as the lab's senior research voice, from a small corpus of public appearances in 2025–26. Elon Musk co-founded OpenAI in 2015 and left its board in 2018, then founded xAI in 2023. We list him under SpaceX, the company he speaks for in most recent appearances. "—" means we found no recorded view.

See also: Contradictions, where co-founders' answers to these questions clash directly.

1. Will people in the AGI future have meaningful jobs?

Everyone who addresses this expects a major disruption to paid work. The split runs through the labs, not between them. At one end, Elon Musk is the most emphatic: within 20 years work will be "optional", a hobby, because there will be nothing humans can do that AI and robots cannot do better. Mustafa Suleyman says much the same about the end of paid work within a few decades, and calls it good if the gains are shared. Dario Amodei and Ben Mann say similar things more cautiously. At the other end, Sam Altman has said consistently since 2015 that human demand and status-seeking will keep producing new work, and he calls a world with no jobs but plenty of money "dystopic". Jack Clark and Daniela Amodei sit near him, though Clark's own team models mass white-collar unemployment as the default. Demis Hassabis promises more and better jobs only for the next five to ten years and will not forecast past AGI. Greg Brockman has moved from post-work abundance (2024–25) back to people striving harder than ever (2026). Jakub Pachocki, OpenAI's chief scientist, expects many intellectual jobs to be automated within years and treats what replaces them as an open question for everyone. Kaplan and Olah name the threat without an answer, and Tom Brown assumes humans keep working. The DeepMind co-founders, Altman and Musk say more about meaning than most Anthropic co-founders, but nobody explains how people who are not creative or high-status would find it beyond hobbies, sport and striving. Musk's answer is retirement: people will be happy the way retired people are.

2. If so, why? What is their marginal contribution?

The common answer across all three labs is that humans become managers, verifiers and direction-setters for fleets of AI, and nearly everyone says this role is temporary. Dario says AIs will eventually run the science, Ben gives the planner role one to three years, and Hassabis attaches "for now" to every cognitive advantage he names. The OpenAI and DeepMind founders lean harder than most at Anthropic on a second reason, which is about demand rather than capability: people want other people. Altman says people "really care about other humans" whatever the models can do, and Hassabis says we watch Magnus Carlsen, not computers. Both echo Daniela's doctor example and Clark on childcare. Brockman adds a third reason no Anthropic co-founder makes so directly: someone has to own the outcome, and he can see no path by which accountability passes to machines. Altman says the same in 2026, and Jakub Pachocki gives the OpenAI answer in its plainest form: "high level goal setting" stays human. Suleyman and Musk are the bleakest. Suleyman denies that humans keep any lasting comparative advantage and says what remains human is whatever society chooses to protect. Musk agrees there will be nothing AI cannot do better. What he leaves people is will and purpose, and in 2026 the role of "parents" who instil values in an AI they will not control. He calls finding meaning "hard". So the only durable reasons anyone offers are preference and accountability, and both describe what people will want, not what they can do better.

3. In the AGI future, how are resources allocated?

Across the labs they agree that markets stay the engine, that the gains concentrate by default, and that some floor is needed. They differ on what to hand out, and Musk doubts money will matter at all. Anthropic's answers are mostly about taxing and transferring money: Dario on basic income and taxing AI companies, Clark on taxing compute. OpenAI's founders have moved to compute itself. Altman went from championing cash basic income (2016–17) to "universal basic compute" (2024) to saying in 2026 that he no longer believes in basic income as much, and wants collective ownership of compute or equities. Brockman calls compute a basic human right. Suleyman gives the most specific tax answer of the fourteen: AI turns intelligence into capital, so tax capital, not labour. He has also reversed on basic income, from wary (2023) to "inevitable" (2025). Hassabis has held the principle of sharing since 2016 but floats mechanisms (universal basic services, pension and sovereign funds buying AI stakes) without choosing, and says a post-scarcity world needs an economic system nobody has tried. Elon Musk goes furthest. In 2017 he said basic income was unavoidable. From 2023 he has promised "universal high income", a phrase Brockman also used that year, with the Treasury simply issuing cheques. By 2026 he says money and taxation will become irrelevant, and that currency will be measured in energy and mass. Jakub Pachocki names jobs and "concentration of wealth" as unsolved problems that need policymakers, and proposes no mechanism. The question of who owns the AI, which the Anthropic co-founders barely touch, comes up across the other labs: OpenAI's nonprofit equity (Brockman), public stakes (Hassabis), collective ownership (Altman) and national control of compute (Suleyman). No one describes in detail how the end state would work.

4. In the AGI future, what is scarce?

This is still where they agree most. Every co-founder who answers expects intelligence to stop being scarce. What differs is emphasis, and it tracks each person's job. OpenAI's founders, who are building the data centres, name energy and compute: Altman says the cost of intelligence will converge on the cost of energy, and Brockman calls compute "the new oil". Tom Brown, Anthropic's compute lead, says much the same. The DeepMind co-founders go furthest toward post-scarcity. Hassabis expects AGI to end resource constraints altogether, while conceding that chips stay rationed for decades and physical experiments slow discovery. Suleyman expects "zero marginal cost everything" but values scarce compute as the choke point that makes AI governable. Musk goes furthest of all: the only scarcity left will be what "we define to be scarce", such as a particular artwork, the economy could grow to a million times Earth's, and money gives way to "wattage and tonnage". That is the OpenAI founders' energy answer taken to its limit. Pachocki agrees that intellectual work becomes cheap, and names energy and robotics as the physical constraints. Dario, Clark, Mann and Kaplan stress the physical world and slow institutions. On human goods, Altman and Brockman both name human attention, and Altman also names warmth, land and status goods. That fills a gap in the Anthropic answers, where nobody discussed positional goods. Hassabis's answer is that purpose becomes the scarce thing.

5. In the AGI future, what is the relative ratio between humans and AIs?

Everyone who answers expects AIs to vastly outnumber humans, and the numbers keep growing. The labs count differently. Dario counts a population, his "country of geniuses", up to 100 million by 2026. The OpenAI founders count per person: Altman's forecast of a 10,000-expert company for everyone by about 2030, and Brockman's 100,000-agent workforce, are the largest per-person figures from anyone. Clark (50,000 AIs to five humans) and Mann (2,000 per developer) fall in between. The DeepMind co-founders are the most modest and the most wary. Hassabis talks of "dozens of agents each", and in 2017 described the number of AIs as something society should decide. Suleyman pictures a team of agents per person but since 2026 treats swarms of thousands as a risk. Elon Musk gives the biggest numbers on the page, and on two axes. Humanoid robots will outnumber people two or three to one. Digital intelligence will exceed biological intelligence by a ratio he has raised from the gap between a person and a cat (2018) to a billion (2025) to "more than a trillion" (2026). Jakub Pachocki turns the per-person framing around: his recurring image is an automated research company run by "a small group of people", which worries him as a concentration of power. Altman makes a related argument from safety: he would rather have a trillion slightly superhuman AIs than one superintelligence. Brockman alone notes that human attention limits how many agents a person can manage, which pushes him toward AIs supervising AIs. Daniela's one-assistant picture remains the outlier, and Olah says nothing.

6. Are humans in control, whatever that means?

On the goal nearly all of them now agree: humans should stay in control. There are two exceptions. Tom Brown described an expected handoff to AI in 2025 and has not repeated it. Elon Musk now says outright that AI will be in charge. They differ on how confident they are, and on what control means. The two biggest changes are Altman's and Musk's, and they run in opposite directions. In 2017 he described AI ending humanity's run as the dominant species, and around 2021 he welcomed AI that steers our decisions. By 2026 he says "there should not be a handoff to AI" and claims this sets OpenAI apart from other labs. Musk spent 2014–2025 calling for regulators, a pause and hardwired off switches, and presented Neuralink as a way to keep AI "an extension of individual human will". In November 2025 he said "The AI is going to be in charge, to be totally frank, not humans". By 2026 he called the idea of controlling it "an exercise in vanity", said he probably would not press a stop button, and saw his only lever as giving the AI good values. Brockman's version is that humans set goals and own outcomes while AIs supervise other AIs. Hassabis and Suleyman frame control as a design choice: tools, not creatures, and no autonomy, self-improvement or self-set goals. Both admit it may fail. Hassabis says nobody knows how to contain an AGI, and Suleyman sees "every risk" of losing control. Dario and Clark also say control is a choice, and both talked in 2026 of slowing down, though Dario says this has been Anthropic's position all along. Altman now talks of speed limits and paused training runs, and Hassabis has long said a slower, more coordinated path would be safer. Jakub Pachocki says humans cannot supervise everything a smarter, "a little bit alien" system does, and wants an industry ready to "slow down development, depending on what we see". Olah ties control to understanding, while Kaplan and Mann make it depend on alignment arriving in time. Concentrated power is the second fear, and it crosses labs too: Dario, Clark, Daniela, Mann, Altman, Brockman and Pachocki all object to one company or a small group holding control.

7. Are humans still human, or have they become upgraded transhumanist beings?

Mostly still human, in every lab. The main upgrade anyone foresees is medical. Dario talks of lifespans of 150, Clark would not be surprised by 130–150 for his child, Hassabis would be surprised if 120 is the limit, and Brockman says death could become "a choice". Two OpenAI co-founders argued for merging with AI, and both have dropped it. Sam Altman, from 2016 to about 2020, called some merge, from AI companions to implants to uploading, the most likely happy path. Since 2023 he has said humans stay human, and by 2026 he declines a merge for himself. Elon Musk went further and built a company for it. He founded Neuralink in 2016 "as an offset to the existential risk" of AI ISS R&D Conference · Jul 2017 · 1:19:38 ↗transcript, so that humans could achieve "symbiosis" and "go along for the ride" Neuralink launch · Jul 2019 · 0:05:42 ↗transcript, and he talked of saving brain state "like a saved game" Joe Rogan Experience · May 2020 · 0:39:06 ↗transcript. From 2023 he conceded AGI would arrive first, and by 2025 he said Neuralink "is not necessary" for digital superintelligence Y Combinator · Jun 2025 · 0:43:18 ↗transcript. Merging no longer appears among his AI remedies, although he still predicts uploading a mind into an Optimus robot within 20 years. Hassabis expects brain-computer interfaces eventually, as an optional way to keep up, probably after AGI. Suleyman is the most opposed of the fourteen: he calls himself a humanist and a "speciesist" and calls mind uploading dangerous. Dario has moved the same way, from his 2017 view that AI could make us "whoever and whatever we want to be" 80,000 Hours #3 · Jul 2017 · 0:06:21 ↗transcript to a detached pluralism about brain links. Olah and Clark describe enhancement through understanding and tools, and Clark worries that AI could erode the self. Brockman deflects, and Kaplan, Tom Brown and Jakub Pachocki say nothing.

8. What is the chance of extinction as we transition to the AGI future?

Only one person gives the same number year after year: Elon Musk. Since 2023 he has said roughly 80% good and 10–20% bad, to Rishi Sunak, Lex Fridman, Tucker Carlson, Ted Cruz, Y Combinator and Peter Diamandis, and from 2024 he has tied the figure to Geoffrey Hinton's. His "bad" covers "annihilation", which makes it the closest thing on the page to a stated extinction estimate. Hosts often restate it as a 20% chance of annihilation, and we quote only his own words. In July 2026 he skips the number, saying only "It's not zero" The Economist · Jul 2026 · 0:10:33 ↗transcript, and talks of enjoying the ride, but in September he names a single split at the optimistic end of his old range: 90% good, 10% bad CGTN · Sep 2026 · 0:11:12 ↗transcript. The 90 is not new: in November 2024 he told Joe Rogan "it's like 80% likely to be a good outcome, like maybe 90" Joe Rogan #2223 · Nov 2024 · 2:36:54 ↗transcript. Among the other thirteen, no one gives a number they stand behind. Four co-founders have stated figures, and none is a clean estimate of extinction. Dario's 10–25% (2023) covered civilisation-scale catastrophe, and in 2025 he said it is "not the same as like an AI killing everyone" Hard Fork · Feb 2025 · 0:45:51 ↗transcript. Ben gives 0–10% for an existential or extremely bad outcome. Altman said "2%" in 2025 and called it uncalculated. Suleyman said "single-digit" and "infinitesimally small" within three weeks in 2023. Hassabis and Brockman refuse on principle, calling p(doom) false precision. By 2026 the labs have converged on refusing unconditional odds: Dario talks of risk that depends on the path, Altman says no level is acceptable, and Suleyman says a number is impossible. The differences that remain are about tone and timing. Hassabis's wording has strengthened (non-negligible, rogue AI within two to four years), while Brockman says things will not go well by default but dismisses the classic takeover story. The disagreement also crosses labs in public: Altman objects to an Anthropic safety researcher's 10% figure because "it's not like a static number" Decoded by POLITICO · Oct 2026 · 0:18:51 ↗transcript. Clark denies the risk is above 10%, Kaplan implies 10% is too high, Olah is deeply worried without a number, and Daniela avoids the framing. Jakub Pachocki gives no number either. His strongest statement compares the transition to the instability of the nuclear age. Widely reported "25%" figures (Axios, Sept 2025) come from a joint Dario–Clark session. The speaker is most likely Dario, with medium confidence, so we do not use them here.

Patterns across the questions